作者：Song Huang; Yuhui  Peng; Jiawen Xu*

期刊:《International Journal of Production Economics》

出版时间：2025, Vol.281

校内级别：T2类

DOI:10.1016/j.ijpe.2025.109522

摘要：

This study examines how channel selection power and brand spillovers affect firms’ channel configuration strategies in a platform retail market. We consider four modes based on the different selling choices of the strong-brand (the former) and weak-brand (the latter) manufacturers, namely, modes r r , a r , r a , and a a , in which r ( a ) stands for the reselling (agency) channel. Meanwhile, the strong-brand manufacturer has the channel selection power, while the platform will consider whether to implement a brand spillover strategy. Some intriguing findings are derived. First, the equilibrium channel structures primarily depend on the channel selection power, degree of complementarity, commission rate, and brand spillover effect. Second, to avoid horizontal externalities, manufacturers will only choose mode r r when the degree of complementarity is high even if the commission rate is zero. Third, when both manufacturers have channel selection power, modes r r , a r , and a a are the optimal channel configurations, while mode r a will be excluded, and the brand spillover effect discourages manufacturers from choosing the agency channel. Finally, endowing manufacturers with channel selection power may result in a triple-win situation for the three firms, although this does not always benefit consumers. Moreover, endowing the weak-brand manufacturer with channel selection power always favors the strong-brand manufacturer in a complementary market, whereas the opposite is true in a substitute market.

关键词：

Channel configuration; Platform retailing; Spillovers; Supply chain management